The Secret Ambition of Racial Profiling by Wu, Steven
TH AL LAW JO RAL
COMMENT
The Secret Ambition of Racial Profiling
In 2000, a year after the shooting of Amadou Diallo, a select committee of
the New York City Council held a series of meetings in the Bronx to address
police-community relations. The committee intended the meetings "to open a
dialogue between police officers and city residents, perhaps even repair
relations," but the first meeting degenerated into a torrent of accusations from
over two hundred attendees on police mistreatment of African-Americans.1
"[O]ne resident after another relat[ed], with a mixture of passion and anger,
humiliating encounters with the police" that they attributed to their race.2 By
the end, police officers could do nothing but sit quietly and hear out the people
they were supposed to serve.
The meeting failed for a simple reason: The committee placed too much
faith in the power of open dialogue and overlooked the bitterness then
underlying any discussion of police-minority relations. A similar problem
afflicts R. Richard Banks's Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War,
which criticizes the current debate over racial profiling for focusing too much
on profiling's alleged irrationality.3 For Banks, the argument that racial
profiling is irrational is mere masking rhetoric, obscuring underlying
grievances about the consequences of profiling for minorities and minority
communities. Banks urges opponents of racial profiling to debate these
grievances openly rather than cloak them with claims of irrationality.
This Comment argues that Banks does not properly take into account the
dangers of open dialogue. Dan Kahan pointed to these dangers six years ago in
1. Juan Forero, In Bronx, Tensions at Meeting on Police-Community Relations, N.Y. TIMtvS, Mar.
28, 200o, at B5.
2. Id. One man, for example, "said he has learned that despite his college education and
middle-class life, he is always seen by police as a black man first. And that, he said, has
meant constant traffic stops." Id.
3. R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571
(2003).
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The Secret Ambition of Deterrence,4 which argued that masking rhetoric is
sometimes necessary to avoid conflicts over controversial topics. After
providing background on the two articles, I argue that the debates Banks wants
us to have about racial profiling are prone to the types of value conflicts that
Kahan identified in Secret Ambition. I conclude that progress is possible if we
forego Banks's contentious debates: The current rhetoric on racial profiling,
despite its many weaknesses, enables us to make limited but important
reforms.
I. BANKS'S CRITIQUE
Racial profiling occurs when law enforcement interprets race as "a mark of
increased risk of criminality."' Most racial profiling today is conducted by
individual officers engaged in street-level policing; it is not generally a practice
authorized by state statutes, local ordinances, or even police manuals or
guidelines.6
By most accounts, the public campaign against racial profiling has been a
great success.7 Banks attributes this success in large part to the popular appeal
of an argument he dubs the "irrationality claim": "the empirical [argument]
that racial profiling is unjustified because blacks and Latinos are no more likely
than whites to commit drug crimes."8 This empirical argument also supports
the related claim that racial profiling "is not, in fact, a sensible crime fighting
tool."9 For Banks, however, the irrationality claim fails to live up to its
reputation, for both empirical and explanatory reasons. First, it ignores
growing evidence of a racial gap in crime rates." Second, the irrationality claim
4. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARv. L. REv. 413 (1999).
5. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 136 (1997).
6. See, e.g., Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1999, § 6 (Magazine),
at S1 (stating that local police officers believe that racial profiling is both necessary and
useful).
7. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 3, at 573 (describing "[t]he extraordinary success of the
campaign" against racial profiling); Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling
Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2002) (describing a national "consensus" on
racial profiling); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial
Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 363 (2001)
(describing the "almost universal condemnation" of the practice).
8. Banks, supra note 3, at 577.
9. David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Redux, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 73,82 (2003).
1o. See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 145 ("It does no good to pretend that blacks and whites are
similarly situated with respect to either rates of perpetration or rates of victimization. They
are not. A dramatic crime gap separates them.").
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does not accurately explain why people oppose racial profiling. According to
Banks, the actual grievances that "animate the campaign against racial
profiling" center on the consequences of street-level profiling, not its
rationality." Specifically, he highlights two issues that have been obscured by
the current focus on the irrationality claim: the poor relationship between
police and minority communities and the high levels of incarceration among
minorities. Banks advocates moving the debate on racial profiling away from a
focus on irrationality and toward "a focus on the consequences of drug policy
and policing practices.
II. KAHAN'S THEORY OF MASKING RHETORIC
In The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, an article on the public debate over
criminal punishment, Dan Kahan offered an argument with striking parallels
to Banks's. Just as Banks argues that the irrationality claim dominates public
debate on how to evaluate racial profiling, Kahan noted that deterrence theory
dominates public debate on how to evaluate criminal punishment. Mirroring
Banks's argument about the irrationality claim, Kahan maintained that
deterrence theory fails to explain punishment on both theoretical and
descriptive levels. It fails as a theory because it is incomplete: "Deterrence...
presupposes a consequentialist theory of value. Yet nothing intrinsic to the
deterrence theory supplies one."1 3 It fails as a description because it does not
clarify how people feel about various punishments, such as the death penalty:
"Even if they honestly believe the deterrence arguments they are making, the
vast majority of citizens and officials don't believe such arguments are essential
to their positions on highly charged issues." 4
But whereas Banks criticizes the masking rhetoric surrounding racial
profiling, Kahan argued that the masking rhetoric of deterrence theory is
valuable precisely because it prevents discussion of the actual grievances
driving people's public arguments: "[T]he real significance of deterrence
theory lies not in what it says but in what it stops us from saying.""5 For Kahan,
public debate on deterrence prevents a clash of fundamental values. Kahan
ii. Banks, supra note 3, at 594; see also id. at 599 ("While some people oppose racial profiling
simply because it is discrimination, much of the opposition to the practice reflects an
underlying opposition to some aspect of the drug war.").
12. Id. at 587.
13. Kahan, supra note 4, at 427.
14. Id. at 435.
is. Id. at 416.
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maintained that individuals evaluate criminal punishment based not on its
deterrent effect, but instead on deeply held moral judgments about their rights
as citizens, the moral worthiness of criminals, and the responsibilities of the
state.6 In a diverse society such as ours, people hold different, often
incommensurable beliefs on these matters. 7 If brought out in the open, these
conflicting beliefs could lead people to distrust, condemn, and even despise
each other, resulting in conflicts that frustrate collective action and complicate
peaceful coexistence.
A masking rhetoric, such as deterrence theory, avoids such poisonous
conflicts by replacing public value judgments with seemingly objective tests
upon which reasonable people can civilly disagree.'" The value of masking
rhetoric is that it elides the differences between people with incommensurable
values and provides at least a tenuous form of common ground from which
cooperation can emerge. Although, on closer inspection, the common ground
provided by a masking rhetoric may only be a fiction, we should not be so
quick to condemn this academic weakness so long as the cooperation it
engenders results in genuine progress.
III. THE DANGERS OF OPEN DIALOGUE ON RACIAL PROFILING
Not all public issues threaten social cohesion by implicating irreconcilable
values. But racial profiling may. The very existence of masking rhetoric
suggests that there are divisive grievances being masked. In Secret Ambition,
Kahan took an almost purposive view of masking rhetoric: Where there is
contentious moral value conflict, masking rhetoric will arise. ' 9 I suggest that
we can also take this argument in reverse: From the existence of masking
rhetoric we can infer that irreconcilable moral or political judgments lurk in the
background. Thus, by identifying a form of masking rhetoric-the irrationality
claim-Banks has provided prima facie evidence that the grievances he
uncovers would be subject to contentious public debate.
16. Id. at 444-45.
17. Id. at 439-40; see also id. at 441-42 (providing "rough expressive profiles of the proponents
and opponents of the death penalty").
18. See id. at 446 ("[I]f I claim to be for/against the death penalty because it is/is not the penalty
most likely to protect lives . . . then I can be seen as saying only that you are factually
misinformed, rather than morally obtuse, for feeling otherwise.").
ig. For example, Kahan recounted how in the case of Brown v. United States, 265 U.S. 335 (1921),
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes "aspir[ed] to channel conflict away from the judicial
process" by deliberately writing his opinion in the language of deterrence, thus masking the
deeper moral values at stake. Kahan, supra note 4, at 434.
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In addition to this general argument, there are more specific reasons to
believe that the particular grievances outlined by Banks risk causing social
tension if openly discussed. First, Banks advocates direct discussion of the
troubled relationship between police and racial minorities. But, as the meeting
in the Bronx demonstrated, the sorry history of this relationship has left each
side with strong views about the other that may poison any direct discussions.
Minority (particularly African-American) communities carry long memories of
violent treatment at the hands of law enforcement, from slavery and Jim Crow
to modern scandals like the shooting of Amadou Diallo and the sexual abuse of
Abner Louima.2 ° On the other side of the line, many police officers continue to
subscribe to "the 'warrior model' of the detached, aloof crime-fighter who daily
battles the hostile enemy- the public,"'" despite attempts by reformers to align
the interests of the police and their constituents." These feelings of mutual
mistrust have already impeded recent efforts to build partnerships between
police and minority communities. 3
Even if both sides do learn to trust each other, they may discover that they
have drastically different values and goals. 4 For example, although both sides
may want more policing, police may want to focus on more serious crimes,"s
while minority communities may prefer more aggressive "quality of life"
policing to prevent low-level "soft crime" such as loitering and small-time
drug-dealing.26 And even if both sides agree to crack down on soft crime,
police may favor an aggressive approach, while minority communities may
20. See Lindsay N. Kendrick, Comment, Alienable Rights and Unalienable Wrongs: Fighting the
"War on Terror" Through the Fourth Amendment, 47 How. L.J. 989, 1031 (2004) (citing
statistical studies showing deep distrust of police and law enforcement among African-
Americans).
21. James Forman, Jr., Community Policing and Youth as Assets, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,
4-5 (2004).
22. See Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to Crime
Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1268
(2000) ("Paradoxically, however, the same dynamics that community policing seeks to
change are a significant obstacle to community policing really taking hold.").
23. See, e.g., David Thacher, Conflicting Values in Community Policing, 35 LAW & Soc'y REv. 765,
783-84 (2oo1); Forero, supra note i.
24. See Thacher, supra note 23, at 766 ("Police and their would-be partners do not always value
the same, or even compatible, things...
2S. Id.
26. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982,
at 29.
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consider such an approach unnecessarily invasive.27 These conflicting
institutional values, when combined with the history of mutual mistrust, pose
serious obstacles to the fruitfulness of any direct discussion between police and
minority communities on their troubled relationship.
Second, Banks urges open debate on the effects that mass incarceration of
minorities has had on minority communities. But direct discussion of the
effects of legitimately imposed punishmentS could be as contentious as the
death penalty debates that Kahan described in Secret Ambition. 9 Two
competing values are at stake: one is the justice of locking away guilty
criminals and vindicating the rights of victims; the other is the injustice of
depriving communities of family members and productive citizens. These two
values coexist and conflict, even within the minority communities most
afflicted by mass incarceration.3" As a result, to borrow Kahan's words, a
debate that directly pits these competing values against each other has the
potential to become "pregnant with accusation"31:
[I]f I favor [incarceration] because it's essential to vindicating the
worth of the victim, then you must be against it because you don't
sufficiently appreciate her worth and overvalue the worth of the
wrongdoer; if I oppose [incarceration] because it is administered in a
way that [harms minority communities], then you must be for it
because you are a racist.32
The academic debate on this subject sometimes adopts such an accusatory
tone. David Cole, for instance, has argued that "the white majority can 'afford'
the costs associated with mass incarceration because the incarcerated mass is
disproportionately nonwhite," and that "in practice the rules assure that law
enforcement prerogatives will generally prevail over the rights of minorities
27. See Jerome H. Skolnick, Terry and Community Policing, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1265, 1268
(1998) (noting "increasing dissatisfaction with the police in minority communities, because
of the large number of people who are being stopped").
28. Banks focuses on the wrongful effects of mass incarceration, rather than the wrongful
imposition of punishment. I assume that he takes as given that the disproportionate
imprisonment of minorities (particularly African-Americans) stems from some increased
proportion of criminality in minority communities. See Banks, supra note 3, at S81-82.
29. See Kahan, supra note 4, at 446.
30. See, e.g., Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1769, 1772 (1992); William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 1oo:1
Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 1233, 1277 (1996).
31. Kahan, supra note 4, at 446.
32. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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and the poor."3 On the other side of the debate, Randall Kennedy has argued
that "efforts to address the danger crime poses to minority communities are
confused and hobbled by a reflexive, self-defeating resort to charges of racism
when a policy, racially neutral on its face, gives rise to racial disparities when
applied."34 If these value-laden accusations become a part of the public
discourse, they may frustrate any attempt to achieve resolution through the
open debates on racial profiling that Banks envisions.
IV. THE VALUE OF THE IRRATIONALITY CLAIM
Of course, conflict over values is sometimes necessary. But the choice here
is not between conflict leading to a political standstill and toleration of an
unjust practice. Rather, the choice is between an emotionally charged debate
on the grievances underlying criticisms of racial profiling, and a less
emotionally charged debate on the irrationality claim. Debating the
irrationality claim may allow us to avoid divisive value conflicts while still
permitting genuine progress toward mending the difficult relationship
between minorities and law enforcement.
The major benefit of the irrationality claim is that it appeals to values that
command wider acceptance than the more contentious values at stake in direct
debates regarding police-minority relations and disproportionate mass
incarceration. First, the empirical nature of the irrationality claim seems more
"objective" or "scientific" than arguments about, say, whether to value victims
or communities more."5 Debates over the irrationality claim thus satisfy what
Kahan referred to as "a social norm against public moralizing" that
"stigmatizes public appeals to contested moral values." 36
Second, as Banks notes,37 the irrationality claim subjects racial profiling to
the condemnation of the widely accepted antidiscrimination norm, which
holds that "discrimination is arbitrary [and therefore illegal] if the criterion
upon which it is based is unrelated to the state purpose.""' The most
contentious modem battles on the use of race in public policy have centered on
33. David Cole, No Equal Justice: How the Criminal Justice System Uses Inequality, CHAMPION,
Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 20, 24.
34. Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1255, 126o (1994).
35. See Kahan, supra note 4, at 446.
36. Id. at 445.
37. Banks, supra note 3, at 6oo.
38. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 109 (1976).
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policies - such as affirmative action or segregation of prisoners3 9 - in which
taking race into account arguably achieves worthwhile goals. By contrast, there
is widespread agreement that race should not be used if it does not advance
public welfare. Profiling based on inaccurate stereotypes of minorities certainly
fails that test.
Third, the irrationality claim addresses the effectiveness of law
enforcement, a goal that could be shared by all the relevant communities
involved in racial profiling: minority communities subject to profiling (because
they bear the brunt of both criminal activity and law enforcement),40 police
(because they wish to use resources efficiently), and nonminority communities
not subject to profiling (because ineffective policing wastes their resources
too). This last group is particularly important. Due to social and residential
segregation, nonminority communities do not bear many of the costs of social
policies that weigh disproportionately on minorities, such as racial profiling. 41
An argument that ties racial profiling to their fiscal interests, however weakly,
may involve them in the problems of minority communities more than an
argument based on consequences that they will never personally witness, such
as the collateral effects of mass incarceration.
But will the irrationality claim in fact lead to progress on racial profiling,
police-minority relations, and the mass incarceration of minorities? The
evidence suggests that the answer is a qualified yes. Although the irrationality
claim has yet to prevail in federal courts,42 state courts have used the statistics
underlying the irrationality claim to invalidate individual instances of racial
profiling.4
3
In addition, investigations into the validity of the irrationality claim may
serve as common ground for law enforcement and minority communities to
develop meaningful relationships. Police-community partnerships have already
been established for the purpose of information-gathering and analysis-the
39. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005).
40. See David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politics of
Distinction," 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2560 (1995) ("Black citizens living in the inner city are
disproportionately victimized by crime, but they are also disproportionately victimized by
law enforcement.").
41. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 46 (1999).
42. See, e.g., Chavez v. 1Il. State Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001).
43. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lora, No. 20020413, 2003 WL 22350945 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept.
12, 2003); State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996).
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precise activities that lie at the heart of the irrationality claim.' Focusing on
data collection is advantageous because "[s]imply convening a group with a
vague mission to discuss race, or the problem of racial profiling, might
degenerate into a shouting match.... Data collection, if nothing else, gives
everyone something discrete to work with and evaluate."4 A cooperative
examination of the irrationality claim also provides the kinds of "formal,
deliberative meetings between police and community residents [that] are the
heart" of the modern trend toward community policing, 6 a strategy of policing
that itself emphasizes strengthening ties between police and the communities
they serve. Partnerships built on the common ground of the irrationality claim
can serve as gateways to further cooperation, including, perhaps, the
examination of more sensitive issues in the future.
CONCLUSION
Banks may be right that the current debate over racial profiling ignores and
even masks people's actual grievances. But the logic of Kahan's article suggests
that this rhetoric is valuable despite being misleading, shallow, and inaccurate.
In a fractious society still divided by race and crime, the irrationality claim
provides some common ground upon which public debate can proceed. This
common ground, in turn, allows us to make fitful moves toward resolving our
underlying grievances. More importantly, it forestalls potentially divisive
cultural warfare-such as that sparked by the current debates over abortion,
gay marriage, and the role of religion in government-in which each side
accuses its opponent of failing to grasp fundamental moral values. The key to
properly evaluating the current rhetoric of racial profiling is understanding that
it is not an end in itself. Rather, the masking rhetoric we use lays the necessary
groundwork for even more meaningful progress in the future.
STEVEN WU
44. See Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 41, 115
(2ool).
45. Id. at 132.
46. Forman, supra note 21, at 8.
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